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Abstract
In many countries, spouses routinely hide income, consumption and assets
from one another. In this paper, I provide a theoretical model in which hiding
is costly and only some expenditure can be hidden. I characterise the set of
ex ante Pareto efficient allocations and show by means of extended examples
that in some cases it can be efficient for one or both partners to lie about
their income. Examples also show that efficient hiding may not be a marker
of power or weakness in the household decision-making process. As such, it
may not be possible to make meaningful inference about the nature of the
household simply by observing whether assets or income are hidden.
Keywords: C9; D9, efficient household, hiding income, family, couples
1. Introduction.
It is well-known and widely accepted that around the world, in many dif-
ferent cultures, spouses routinely keep some consumption and income from
their partners. The pattern is documented in academic work by anthropolo-
gists, economists and other social scientists (Bruce (1989)) as well as being a
frequent topic of popular culture. We can identify many motives for hiding
spending from a spouse, but the central and most obvious reason is that
within the partnership the goals of an individual may differ from those of the
household of which they are a part. These varied motives suggest some value
INational Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Roppongi 7-22-1, Minato-ku,
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in developing theoretical models of hiding in marriage such as those recently
and separately proposed by Malapit (2009) and Castilla and Walker (2013).
Observing the scattered evidence on assets prompts a number of ques-
tions, three of which will be the focus of this paper. First, can we equate
hiding with inefficiency? It is tempting to interpret evidence of hiding as a
sign of inefficiency because for one thing it is not immediately obvious why
spouses who are engaged in a long-run relationship would draw up a marital
contract that give incentives for dishonesty (Chiappori (1992)). Moreover,
since hiding resources is usually costly, a contract that gives the hiding in-
dividual the correct incentive to reveal true income or wealth would seem to
dominate an agreement based on deception. Now, this intuition, based per-
haps on the well-known revelation principle is not necessarily correct and in
fact, in a literature that has received intermittent attention, several authors
have already shown that the revelation principle need not apply when the
feasible message space (e.g. statements about income) depends on the state
of the world (e.g. actual income) ( Lacker and Weinberg (1989) Green and
Laffont (1986)or Postlewaite (1979)).
A second, related question is this: can mutual hiding be efficient? The
current theoretical work on dishonesty, such as Celik (2006) is not concerned
with household relationships and more to the point the papers in the literat-
ure focus on one-sided uncertainty in their examples, leaving the issue of the
optimality of mutual hiding so far unexplored. Meanwhile, on the empirical
side, much of the evidence on intrahousehold behaviour that is available fo-
cuses on one gender or the other or provides only reports on aggregates or
averages. It is not clear from this literature whether there is systematic and
mutual hiding of assets within the same relationship and what mutual hiding
would mean for identification of household models.
A third question naturally arises in combination with the first two: is
hiding a sign of weakness or of strength in a relationship? In other words,
are individuals with low bargaining strength in the household relationship
more likely to resort to asset hiding or is it the case that the ability to hide
assets gives individual spouses the power to extract more favourable terms
from the household bargain?
Taking its cue from the mechanism design literature (e.g. Lacker and
Weinberg (1989)), the general lesson from this paper is that hiding may be
ex-ante Pareto efficient. Moreover, mutual hiding may be efficient. And,
efficient hiding may not be linked to the power of a spouse: it may be the
weak spouse or the strong spouse who hides. Finally, hiding may be optimal
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even when the utilities of spouses have equal weight in household decisions.
It follows that observing hiding may tell us little about the efficiency of the
household process or about the degree of equality in household decision-
making. It is worth noting that I am not claiming that a cooperative model
is necessarily the right one, only that hiding per se is compatible with ex-ante
efficiency.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in the next section I provide some
motivating background in the form of a survey of some of the worldwide
evidence on spousal income, asset and consumption hiding.1 The survey is
incomplete, both in the sense that not all societies can be accommodated
in one article, but also because much of the evidence on hiding is presented
only tangentially in papers devoted to other aspects of relationships or house-
hold behaviour. I then present a basic cooperative model of the household in
which income is stochastic, and income hiding is generally feasible but costly.
In the model once income is privately revealed, each partner must make a
declaration about their income. Ex ante, for each declared pair of incomes,
the household agrees an allocation of resources and thereby a pair of pub-
licly observed utilities. Partners who have hidden income may also receive
additional, unobservable utility from that resource. We look for mechanisms
that maximize ex ante household welfare, defined as a weighted sum of ex
ante utility for each player. By definition, ex ante welfare is ex ante Pareto
efficient, but the key question is whether hiding is part of that efficiency. As
Lacker and Weinberg (1989) or Green and Laffont (1986) show, there are no
clear general conditions under which the revelation principle does not hold.
In the case of one sided potential hiding between principal and agent, Celik
(2006) provides a sufficient condition for truth-telling to be optimal (see also
Kartik (2009)’s model of a sender-receive game where the sender may lie at
a cost).2 I therefore use a series of examples to explore the issues.
1Hiding may refer to consumption, to income or to assets. In a dynamic model there
must be a link between different forms of housing, though as the next section reveals the
evidence on hiding is not thorough enough to show up this relationship in any detail.
2Where there is one sided asymmetric information a sufficient condition for truth-telling
to be a feature of the optimum is nesting of types, meaning that if a type i can send a
message that he or she is actually type j, then type i can also send any message that type
j can send (Green and Laffont (1986)).
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2. The Evidence on Hiding.
One common thread that links nearly all of the studies listed below and
summarized in Table 1 is that their focus is only incidentally on hiding.
Most often hiding behaviour is revealed when researchers ask questions about
household money management or about the knowledge that one spouse has
about the affairs and behaviour of the other spouse (Bennett (2013)). In
many cases only one spouse is interviewed, making results partial. Generally
then, the evidence is fragmentary and sometimes it is elusive.3 One finding
is that spouses often hide resources, but that there is shared awareness of
this fact within the household, instanced by Dagnelie and LeMay (2008)
report on a survey of 572 husbands and wives in Benin on the outskirts of
the city of Cotonou (which has around 0.75m inhabitants). They find that
79% of respondents do not know their spouse’s income and 76% believe that
their partner does not know their income. They state that secrecy and a
norm of not enquiring too deeply about a partner’s income helps spouses
hide their income and retain control over how it is spent. A similar pattern
is reported in Gracia Clark’s (1994) study of trading women in west African
cities, where shared budgets between spouses were most unlikely. She states
that amongst the Asante of Kumasi in Ghana, “virtual ignorance of the
husband’s amount and sources of income is not uncommon and some of the
women openly recommended it. As long as he contributed adequately to the
children’s expense, it was better not to know about the rest. Besides, he was
more likely to pay his share if he did not know the full extent of your own
income.” P. 340. She notes though some women stating that it was better
to live with their husbands in order to monitor their income.
For the UK, Pahl (1990) cites historical evidence that many wives are
unaware of their husband’s earnings. She notes trends towards individual
money management within households, but this does not say anything about
whether tendencies are associated with greater hiding of spending and earn-
ing. More detailed evidence is available for Nigeria. Based on a sample of
3There are sources that are more or less anecdotal. For instance, writing about a
small industry in Japan that facilitates hiding, George Mikes states that “Pay-packets are
printed and supplied to order, showing the required smaller sums; replicas of the company’s
bags, typography, pay slips, etc. A man may open his pay-packet take out a few thousand
yen for his own private use and still deliver a properly sealed and seemingly unopened
pay-packet [to his wife].” p. 161, Land of the Rising Yen, Penguin London, 1970.
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Yoruba women from 226 conjugal units in the urban setting of Lagos, Nigeria,
Fapohunda (1988) finds that 80% of wives did not know their husband’s in-
come and 65% did not know his expenditure pattern. Similar results were
found amongst traditional and modern self-styled families. According to
the wives, only a small percentage of couples explicitly pooled their income,
though often particular areas of expenditure were assigned to one partner’s
responsibility. In a companion piece, and using evidence from a number of
countries, including Haiti and Nigeria, Bruce (1989) provides a wide-ranging
survey of similar studies that also document the extent to which veils of ig-
norance partially obscured partner’s understanding of their spouse’s income,
consumption and savings behaviour. Some of these conclusions draw on
earlier work by Hill (1972), in rural Nigeria who noted the rearing of goats
by Hausa women as assets “maintainable by children, removable on divorce,
and safe (by tradition) from seizure by husbands, against whom there would
be a right of appeal to the masu sarauta”, p. 317 (see also Guyer (1988)).
Studying a group of 187 households living in Mayur Vihar and Kalyanpuri
colonies on the eastern edge of Delhi in India, Subramanian (2008) reports
that, “women or children hide or stealthily put away small amounts of money
for some personal use. The research does not identify whether men are aware
of this hiding in some way or other. Often women may hide the money to
pay a child’s school fees or clear some debt.” Page 106. She notes that men
typically retain - which of course is not the same as hiding - a significant
portion of their income for personal use and even when this is excessive wo-
men rarely complain, because “Fights may lead to the man asking his wife
to leave the house and so women rarely complain. This fear is especially
strong if they complain publicly, which is why most complaints are confined
to members of their natal families and intimate female friends.” P 107.
Side-by-side evidence from both husbands and wives is rare, but sug-
gests that hiding consumptin or assets is concentrated in a limited number
of goods. In an intriguing analysis of over 10,000 households drawn from
two waves of the Indonesian Family Life survey, Matsumoto (2007) finds ma-
jor discrepancies between self-reported ownership of assets amongst couples.
Some of the differences at the individual household level may be random,
due to recall biases or over-optimism about values. However Matsumoto
finds that in particular, wives report significantly less ownership of jewellery
and personal savings when interviewed in the presence of husbands, com-
pared to situations where the wife is interviewed separately. For other assets
such as housing, land and furniture no specific pattern emerges. Meanwhile,
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for men there are no systematic discrepancies across any of the assets. Eroglu
(2009) interviews separately 17 spouses from low-income families in Ankara,
Turkey. She reports that 8/17 wives had ‘secret kitties’ for hidden expendit-
ure, with the mean size of the fund equal to around 3% of mean monthly
household income. Kitties were common in households where women were
responsible for handling money, but only occurred in one household where
husbands actively monitored expenditure. Women accumulated these funds
in various ways, not just from personal earnings but also through reducing
claimed personal spending, “b) inflating claimed household expenditure, c)
keeping the money saved from household shopping, and d) keeping the differ-
ence between home-made substitutes and their market equivalents.” Eroglu
(2009) p. 69. The money was used in different ways: to provide a buffer in
household money management, as well as to pursue purchases (often for the
household) that the wives felt husbands undervalued or would block.
Recent experimental data has provided further within household data.
Iversen et al. (2006) conduct an experiment with 240 couples using variants
of a simple voluntary contribution game in which the endowment of each
partner is a secret. The location is Bufumbo sub-county and Sironko Dis-
trict on the slopes of Mt Elgon in south eastern Uganda, a densely settled
rural area where livelihoods are predominantly agricultural, but still com-
plex and diverse. In the games, despite the fact that there is a 50% premium
for making public contributions to the pool, the authors discover that the
majority of individuals keep back some money from the common account.
In follow-up interviews with 51 couples that participated in the experiments,
they find imperfect knowledge of spousal finances to be common, at least in
wives’ accounts. 72 percent of men claim full knowledge of wives’ finances,
and 92 percent that their wives fully know theirs. In wives’ accounts these
figures are startlingly different: 21 and 14 percent, respectively. In related
studies for India, Nigeria and Ethiopia respectively, Kebede et al. (2011) ,
Munro et al. (2011) and Munro et al. (2010) find similar tales of hiding and
ignorance. As with Matsumoto’s study they also find differences in assets
reported by the partners when they are questioned separately.
Ashraf (2009)’s experimental investigation of saving and consumption
decisions in the Philippines is motivated by the practices of household. Indi-
vidual spouses receive an endowment that must be invested in a joint account,
in a private account or taken as a private gift certificate subject to alternative
experimental conditions. She finds men’s saving behaviour to be strategic:
they are more willing to hide money in a private account or spend it on per-
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sonal consumption if the decision is kept private from their spouse. Women’s
behaviour, in contrast, is largely invariant to changes in the experimental
conditions. Further experimental evidence on hiding is provided by Jakiela
and Ozier (2011). In this Kenyan based study, individuals had opportunities
to hide (at a cost) experimental winnings. Women who had relatives present
in the experiment were willing to pay more to hide. Another experiment
based on 250 couples from the Siaya district of eastern Kenya, Hoel (2012)
finds that both men and women give less to their partners in a dictator
game, when the transfer is anonymous, compared to the situation where the
source of transfers were identifiable. Interestingly, Hoel (2012) reports that
individuals who state that their partners know their expenditures were more
likely to behave strategically in the experiment.
Using data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, Chen (2006) ob-
serves that women modify activities in the wake of their spouse’s migration
in a manner consistent with a switch towards harder to monitor activities
that are personally favoured. With the father away, girls’ household labour
is higher and mothers’ hours of work are lower. Meanwhile, choices that are
more easily monitored by the father, namely children’s schooling and health
- are not affected by migration, controlling for changes in income. She ar-
gues that the data is not compatible with a unitary model, but would fit
a non-cooperative model with costly monitoring. De Laat (2008) considers
the other side of this asymmetric information problem, interviewing informal
settlement dwellers in Nairobi, Kenya and finding that men who have mi-
grated alone spend considerable resources in monitoring expenditure by their
wives. Investments include co-location of spouses near the husband’s siblings
and frequent home visits. Husbands make more frequent visits home when
wives live close to their own siblings. The men also attach conditions on re-
mittances to ensure that they are spent on observable goods. Despite these
efforts, only 30% of men in the sample report that they know how exactly
how remittances are spent by their spouses.
While, Zelizer (1997) offers an intriguing round-up of historical evidence
on hiding by wives, more recent or systematic evidence on the phenomenon
in the USA is scant. Zagorsky (2003) uses five cohorts from the US National
Longitudinal Survey which (sometimes) interviews spouses separately. He
notes that husbands tend to give higher values for income assets and wives
report higher figures for debts. Meanwhile both partners tend to give higher
figures for their own income and lower figures for their partners (compared
to their partner’s answers). What is not clear is the reason for the wide-
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spread discrepancies – i.e. are they an artefact of the survey process, do they
represent misunderstanding or do they represent the hiding of assets, debts
and income by one or both partners. Lee and Pocock (2007) study saving
by couples in South Korean where individual bank accounts are the norm
and where the law provides strong protection to individual assets at the time
of divorce. Using the Korean Household Panel Survey they find that where
women have a relatively strong bargaining position savings are higher and
women save relatively more in their own accounts. They note that the law in
South Korea limits the ability of partners to know each other’s financial af-
fairs and this has been criticized for the protection it gives to (male) spouses
who hide assets.
Most work on asset hiding has been empirical, but two pioneering papers
which have theoretical models of spousal money hiding are Malapit (2009)
and Castilla (2010) that build on earlier bargaining models (e.g. Manser
and Brown (1980)) and non-cooperative models such as Aura (2002) and
Lundberg and Pollak (1996) . In Malapit’s model, spouses separately and
non-cooperatively decide how much of their individual incomes to contrib-
ute to a household pool, out of which benefits are produced according to a
function, G(.) which represents the household’s agreed bargaining solution.
In the specific form of the model G has the Cobb-Douglas form G =
(
xh
)α
(xw)β where xh and xw represent the declared incomes of husband and wife
respectively, and α + β < 1, giving decreasing returns. Total benefits to
the individual are a weighted sum of G and the income kept back from the
spouse. There are two versions of the model. In one each person decides
separately what share of income to contribute. This model produces the res-
ult that individual contribution rates are independent of the other spouse’s
income. Alternatively, she considers a case where one spouse has the power
to choose a uniform contribution rate for both spouses.
The model is slightly different in Castilla (2010) which is applied to house-
hold data on income and expenditure for Ghana. In that model it is only
the husband who has income to hide. In one version of the model, he must
consider what income to give to his wife who, in turn, controls investment
in a household public good. In the core version of the model, allocation
decisions are ex post Pareto efficient, with bargaining powers determined
by revealed income. Thus a husband has an incentive to reveal income (it
raises bargaining power), but an incentive to keep income back (it can then
be dedicated to private consumption). Together these papers form a useful
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point of comparison for the current exercise: their common starting point is
a non-cooperative model of the household. The question I wish to address
here is whether hiding can be a property of efficient models of the household.
3. A Basic Model of Efficient Hiding.
The previous section has set out some of the evidence on hiding within
marriage from very different cultures. In this section, I propose a simple
model in which hiding can be efficient. I set out the theory in three stages.
The first stage involves an abstract model in utility space where individual
incomes can vary. In the second stage I simplify this model to a situation
where one agent only has risky income, which can produce one of three values.
In the third stage some examples are considered in which both agents have
stochastic income.
There are two individuals k = 1, 2 with utilities u and v, respectively.
Agent k has possible states j = 1, ...Nk all of which are equally probable.
Thus there are N1×N2 possible states of nature, where I think of a state as
being an income realisation for each agent. States are uncorrelated so that
an agent learns nothing about the spouse’s state from his or her own state.4
At the start of the game, each agent learns his or her own state, but
remains in ignorance about the partner’s state. Agent k sends a message θk.
For each agent, the set of messages is potentially constrained. Specifically,
let M(j) be the feasible set of messages for an agent in state j. Suppose that
M(j) = {k : j − 1 ≤ k ≤ j}. That is an agent in the lowest possible state
cannot lie, while agents in higher states can pretend to have a state at most
one below the true value. The idea of the restriction is that stating an income
higher than the truth may be impossible because it could require a level of
consumption that is not feasible. On the other hand it is possible to report a
lower state, because some income can be consumed secretly. However there
are limitations to the degree to which consumption and therefore income can
be hidden. Allowing at most two possible messages per state simplifies the
analysis that follows but is not essential to the argument.5
4In some situations this may be unrealistic, especially when for instance, both spouses
are agricultural workers in the same region. Nevertheless it is a useful starting point for
an analysis of hiding.
5If agent in state j can send any message k ≤ j then for one-sided asymmetric inform-
ation the nesting condition is satisfied (Green and Laffont (1986)). It is possible that in
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Table 1: Summary of income hiding.
Country Study Main Points
Benin Dagnelie and
LeMay (2008)
79% of 572 survey subjects do not know their spouse’s
income and and 76% believe that their partner does not
know their income.
PR China Chen (2006) Survey data. After spouse migration women switch
towards harder to monitor activities that are personally
favoured.
Ethiopia Kebede et al.
(2011)
1200 couples in a common pool experiment that takes
place in several regions. Most spouses keep back (i.e.
hide) money.
Ghana Castilla (2010) Survey amongst Asante women in Kumasi. Women
commonly do not know spouses’ income. Some
recommended mural ignorance.
India Subramanian
(2008)
187 low income families in Delhi in a qualitative survey.
Men and women hide money.
India Munro et al.
(2011)
1200 couples in an common pool experiment, when
subjects may at a cost keep money private. Most spouses
hide something from their partners.
Indonesia Matsumoto
(2007)
From the Indonesia Family Life Survey. Evidence of asset
hiding by both sexes.
Kenya De Laat (2008) Survey evidence of investment in monitoring and
controlling of wives by male migrants.
Kenya Hoel (2012) Experiment: spouses in a dictator game give less to
partners when there is an opportunity to hide
Kenya Anderson and
Baland (2002)
Women using ROSCAS as a means to hide savings from
spouses.
Kenya Jakiela and Ozier
(2011)
Experiment. Subjects, particularly women, pay more to
hide lottery winnings if relatives are present in the
experiment
Mali Castle et al.
(1999)
55 women in a qualitative study document high levels of
hidden contraceptive use.
Nigeria Fapohunda
(1988)
Goats as easily hideable assets for rural Hausa women
Nigeria Hill (1969) 226 Yoruba women, from which 80% of wives did not
know their husband’s income and 65% did not know his
expenditure pattern.
Nigeria Munro et al.
(2010)
800 couples and 80 polygynous triples in a common pool
experiment. Most spouses hide something from their
partners.
Philippines Ashraf (2009) Subjects in an experiment and experts report hiding as
commonplace.
South
Korea
Lee and Pocock
(2007)
Discusses ongoing criticism of a marital property law that
allows spousal hiding of assets.
Turkey Eroglu (2009) In 41% of 17 low income families in Ankara, wives had
‘secret kitties’
Uganda Iversen et al.
(2006)
240 couples in a common pool experiment. Around 45%
couples hide income.
UK Rake and
Jayatilaka (2002)
Interview and qualitative evidence that some income
hiding is common.
USA Zelizer (1997) Historical data on wives’ hiding strategies.
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Income that is hidden may be kept for private consumption. Because
effective lying about the state is potentially costly, the reports made about
the state of the world may affect the set of feasible utilities that can arise
through some process of household bargaining. So each pair of states, (j, k)
and each pair of reports (θ1, θ2) is associated with a utility possibility set
(UPS) for the household, which I denote by F (θ1, θ2 | j, k). The UPS is the
set of feasible pairs (u, v) given actual and declared states of the world. I
assume that
Definition 1. ∀ (j, k), (θ1, θ2) the UPS is a compact, strictly convex, non-
empty subset of R2+ . If (u, v) ∈ F (θ1, θ2 | j, k) then (au, bv) ∈ F (θ1, θ2 | j, k)
for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. Moreover F (j, k | j, k) ⊆ F (j′, k′ | j′, k′)
whenever j ≤ j′ and k ≤ k′.
The utility possibility frontier (UPF) then consists of the subset of UPS
elements that is undominated within the UPS. That is,
Definition 2. UPF (θ1, θ2 | j, k) = {(u, v) | v = max {v | (u, v) ∈ F (θ1, θ2 | j, k)}}
I assume the following additional property for the UPS:
Definition 3. Costly hiding: ∀ (j, k), (θ1, θ2) ∈ M(j) ×M(k), F (θ1, θ2 |
θ1, θ2) ⊆ F (θ1, θ2 | j, k) ⊆ F (j, k | j, k). Strictly costly hiding: costly
hiding and ∀ (u, v) ∈ F (θ1, θ2 | j, k) ∃ (u′, v′) ∈ F (j, k | j, k) s.t. (u′, v′) >
(u, v) whenever (θ1, θ2) 6= (j, k) .
This assumption says that lying about the true state may reduce the size
of the UPS. However, lying can make the set no bigger than the feasible set
available if the message sent were actually true. This amounts to saying that
at worst, there is free disposal of income that is hidden from the spouse and at
best this hidden income can be used as productively as income that is visible
to all. The term costless hiding shall mean that F (j, k | j, k) = F (θ1, θ2 | j, k)
for feasible (θ1, θ2) and completely costly hiding is strictly costly hiding and
some cases a person can truly hide all their income if they make no attempt to consume it,
but I claim it is much harder to hide some income but still use some of it for consumption.
That said, the main purpose of the assumption on hiding adopted here is to show that
there exists relatively simple and not unrealistic models in which hiding is efficient.
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F (θ1, θ2 | θ1, θ2) = F (θ1, θ2 | j, k) whenever (θ1, θ2) 6= (j, k) . Hiding may
be privately efficient for player 1 if there exists, j, k, u, u′, v,θ2, such that,
(u, v) ∈ UPF (j, θ2 | j, k), (u, v) ∈ UPF (j − 1, θ2 | j, k) and u′ > u. In other
words, given the utility assigned to the spouse, player 1 could be better off
misrepresenting his or her income. A similar definition can be made for player
2. Obviously costless hiding implies that hiding is privately efficient, but the
converse is not necessarily true.
A household allocation rule is a mapping that relates messages to utilities
(perhaps via the allocation of declared resources). Let uij and vij refer to the
utilities when the state of the world is (i, j). The household seeks a household
allocation rule to maximize ex ante household welfare, w:
w =
∑
i
∑
j
(αuij + (1− α) vij)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The weight αis the weight placed on each household
member and is treated as exogenous here. In this context, the first best
outcome is the result of maximizing household welfare subject to the following
constraints:
(uij, vij) ∈ F (θ1, θ2 | i, j) (1)
(θ1, θ2) ∈M(i)×M(j) (2)
Explicit requirements that uij and vij are both non-negative for all i and j
are redundant given the definition of F and the requirement that allocations
should be in F. There is no assumption that the messages be truthful here,
but I note in passing that the assumption of costly hiding implies that at the
first best, (θ1, θ2) = (i, j).
The (constrained) optimum is the result of maximization of household
welfare with the additional pair of constraints on the equilibrium value of
(θ1, θ2): ∑
j
uij
(
θ1
) ≥∑
j
uij
(
θ1
′
)
, ∀θ1′ ∈M(i) (3)
∑
i
vij
(
θ2
) ≥∑
i
vij
(
θ2
′
)
, ∀θ2′ ∈M(j) (4)
These constraints state that at an optimum, each individual sends the
message that given the household allocation rule, maximizes his or her own
expected utility.
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I consider two sorts of potential optimum. The first is the standard one
in which truth-telling is weakly optimal for each player at the equilibrium.
I call this a truthful equilibrium. In the truthful equilibrium, the allocation
rule also satisfies (θ1, θ2) = (i, j), or:
∑
j
uij (i) ≥
∑
j
uij
(
θ1
′
)
, ∀θ1′ ∈M(i) (5)
∑
i
vij (j) ≥
∑
i
vij
(
θ2
′
)
, ∀θ2′ ∈M(j) (6)
These truth-telling constraints bind. In the second case, in at least one
state, one or more players strictly prefers to lie about their true state at
the optimum. I call this a dishonest equilibrium. Note that the definition
of dishonest and truthful equilibria is disjunctive. The actual optimum is
whichever is higher out of the honest and dishonest equilibria.
Proposition 1. In any optimum, both players report honestly their highest
and lowest states of the world.
Proof. By construction it is not possible for a player in the lowest state to be
dishonest. Suppose a player is dishonest about the highest state. Then the
message(s) associated with this state are redundant. Then given the Costly
Hiding assumption, we can rewrite the allocations associated with the highest
states in such a way that the player receives as much from telling the truth
as she or he does from being dishonest.
Corollary 2. When each player has at most two states of the world, then
the optimum is a truthful equilibrium.
Consider two problems, A and B, where F (j, k | j, k) is the same in both
A and B for all i and j. We say that B has a higher cost of hiding, if for all
feasible θ1, θ2, j, k, FB(θ1, θ2 | j, k) ⊆ FA(θ1, θ2 | j, k)
Proposition 3. Suppose that for problem, A, the first best is optimal and
that B has a higher cost of hiding compared to A. Then the first best is also
optimal for B.
Proof. If the optimum is the first best, then it is also truth-telling. Since,
FB(j, k | j, k) = FA(j, k | j, k), the first best outcome in B is the same as
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that in A. Suppose the truth-telling equilibrium that implements the first
best in A was not truth-telling in B. In other words, there is some (j, k) and
an associated feasible message such that either∑
k
u
(
θ1
)
>
∑
k
u (j) , θ1 ∈M(j)
or, ∑
i
v
(
θ2
)
>
∑
i
v (k) , θ2 ∈M(k)
Given that B differs from A only in that B has a higher cost of hiding,
then a truthful equilibrium in A is also implementable in B. But that is the
first best, so it is also the optimum in problem B.
Since, if hiding is completely costly the first best outcome is implement-
able, the proposition establishes the fact that for an underlying UPS, as the
cost of hiding rises, there is a point beyond which the optimum is the first
best. Incidentally, the proposition also shows that household utility in the
truth-telling equilibrium rises as the cost of hiding rises. This suggests that
if the truth-telling equilibrium is optimal in A then it is also optimal in B,
but in fact a rise in cost of hiding may increase household utility in the dis-
honest equilibrium if there are some truth-telling constraints that bind in
both problem A and B.
4. One sided hiding.
The propositions do not demonstrate that the optimum is dishonest. I
now present a series of extended examples to show that dishonesty may be
optimal. In the first example we consider a situation where agent 1 has
three possible states, whereas the state and therefore income for person 2 is
certain. This unilateral hiding case illustrates many of the main points of
the theory. In the example, a player who reports state i − 1 when the real
state is i can obtain δ units of utility in addition to any utility obtained from
the household allocation.
Let subscripts i = 1, ..., 3 denote states of the world and summarize the
UPF in state i by the function, fi(u) = max(v | (u, v) ∈ UPF (i | i)). Given
that UPS is strictly convex, then fi i = 1, ..., 3 is a strictly concave function.
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In a truthful equilibrium the following incentive compatibility and feasibility
constraints apply:
u3 ≥ u2 + δ (7a)
u2 ≥ u1 + δ (7b)
vi ≤ fi(ui) i = 1, ..., 3 (7c)
In other words, the utility obtained by player 1 from truthfully announ-
cing the state must be at least as great as the utility from reporting the next
lower state.
In considering the dishonest equilibrium, I note first from the general pro-
positions that it is state 2 that will be misreported. The following constraints
apply:
u2 = u1 + δ (8a)
vi ≤ fi(ui) i = 1, 3 (8b)
v2 ≤ f1(u2 − δ) (8c)
Collectively, label the first set of constraints as the truth-telling con-
straints and the second set as the dishonest constraints. Define {uT1 , uT2 ,uT3 } =
argmax vT = v1 + v2 + v3 subject to u
T
1 + u
T
2 + u
T
3 ≥ u and the truth-telling
constraints and define {uD1 , uD2 , uD3 } = argmax vD = v1 + v2 + v3 subject to
the dishonest constraints and uD1 +u
D
2 +u
D
3 ≥ u . Meanwhile, let u∗i i = 1, .., 3
and v∗i i = 1, .., 3 represent the first-best solution.
The following will be true.
Proposition 4. If α′ > α, then, (i) uD(α′) ≥ uD(α), vD(α′) ≤ vD(α); (ii)
uT (α′) ≥ uT (α), vT (α′) ≤ vT (α).
Proof. Since the argument in both (i) and (ii) is the same we drop the su-
perscripts on u and v. We also use u′ to mean u(α′) and so on. For the
proof, first note that changes in α do not change the set of feasible val-
ues for u and v. It follows that, α′u′ + (1 − α′)v′ ≥ α′u + (1 − α′)v and
αu+ (1− α)v ≥ αu′ + (1− α)v′. Suppose that u′ < u and v < v′. Then, 0 >
α′(u′−u) ≥ (1−α′)(v−v′). Since α < α′ then 0 > α(u′−u) > (1−α)(v−v′)
but then, αu+ (1− α)v < αu′ + (1− α)v′ which is a contradiction.
Since the UPS is strictly convex then I can make the stronger claim that
u is strictly increasing in α when u is in the interior of its feasible set.
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Proposition 5. α′ > α→ (i) uiT ′ ≥ uTi ; (ii) uiD′ ≥ uDi i = 1, ..., 3;
Proof. See appendix, but note by way of intuition that either uTi+1 = u
T
i + δ
in the Truthful solution or uTi = u
∗
i . As a result, when the same truth-telling
constraints are binding at both α′ and α then by the same kind of revealed
preference argument used in Proposition 4 the proposition holds. Meanwhile
for the dishonest case, the allocation in state 1 and 3 is u∗i so again a revealed
preference argument can be made. The full proof is longer because of the
possibility that the set of binding constraints may differ between α and α′.
Let vT (u) be the maximum value of v possible for a given value of u
when the truth-telling constraints are satisfied. Define vD(u) in an analogous
manner.
Proposition 6. Suppose f1(u
T
2 − δ) > f2(uT2 ) then vD(u) > vT (u).
Proof. Suppose the truth-telling constraint on 2 is binding, so that uT1 =
uT2 − δ. Consider the dishonest allocation where in declared states i=1,3,
uTi = u
D
i so that in state i = 2, u
D
2 = u
T
2 − δ. By assumption vT = f1(uT1 ) +
f2(u
T
2 ) + f3(u
T
3 ) < f1(u
T
1 ) + f1(u
T
2 − δ) + f3(uT3 ). Thus, vT < vD. If the
constraint, uT2 ≥ uT1 + δ does not bind, then, uT2 > uT1 + δ. As before
vT = f1(u
T
1 ) + f2(u
T
2 ) + f3(u
T
3 ) < f1(u
T
1 ) + f1(u
T
2 − δ) + f3(uT3 ). Consider
uD1 = (
uT1 +u
T
2 −δ
2
) while uD3 = u
T
3 . Since fi(.) is concave, f1(u
T
1 ) + f1(u
T
2 − δ) +
f3(u
T
3 ) ≤ 2f1(u
T
1 +u
T
2 −δ
2
) + f3(u
T
3 ) and again we have v
D > vT .
Write UPFi to mean UPF (i | i) and say that the UPFi, i = 2, 3 has the
single-crossing property when there exists u◦i such that fi−1(u
◦
i −δ)−fi(u◦i ) =
0 and for all feasible ui 6= u◦i , (fi−1(ui − δ)− fi(ui)) (u◦i − ui) < 0.
Proposition 7. Suppose UPF 2 has the single-crossing property. Then there
exists u◦ such that for all feasible u > u◦, vD(u)− vT (u) > 0.
Proof. By the single crossing property f1(u2 − δ) > f2(u2) for all u2 > u◦2.
Thus by Proposition 6, the result holds provided that there is a u◦ such that
uT2 = u
◦
2. By the strict concavity of the fi functions, for any u, the optimal
value of uTi is unique. Then, since the constraint set is compact, invoking the
Maximum Theorem (Berge (1963)), each of the uTi is continuous in u. And
by Propositions 4 and 5 each of the uTi is increasing in u. By the definition
of the fi functions there is a value of u for which u
T
2 < u
◦
2. If there is no
feasible u for which uT2 > u
◦
2 then the theorem holds but it may be empty of
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content. If there is a u such that uT2 > u
◦
2then by the continuity of u
T
i and the
Mean Value Theorem, there is a u such that f1(u
T
2 − δ)− f2(uT2 ) = 0.
Single crossing is reasonable if say the utility obtainable from hiding is
separable from utility obtainable within the household. Then representing
state 2 as state 1 to the spouse offers the hider a fixed reward. Meanwhile
if say the UPF is homothetic, the concave nature of the UPF also implies
single crossing.
Proposition 8. Suppose the UPF2 has the single-crossing property, then
wD − wT is monotonically increasing in α.
Proof. (see appendix)
Proposition 8 is conditional: it does not state that there is value of α for
which the dishonest equilibrium is optimal. Still, the following will be true.
Corollary 9. Suppose for some α, wD = wT . Then, for higher α the op-
timum is the dishonest equilibrium. Conversely, for lower α, the optimum is
the truth-telling equilibrium.
Proof. (see appendix)
Intuitively, the change in w for a small change in α is proportional to
(u − v). So we need to establish that if household utility is the same in
the two equilibria, then (u− v) is higher in the dishonest equilibrium. This
is equivalent to showing that uD > uT where uD is utility in the dishonest
equilibrium and uT is utility in the truth-telling equilibrium.
It is worthwhile to consider some policy-oriented features of the model
by considering how the nature of the optimal contract changes depends on
α and δ. The motivating idea is that it might be possible to manipulate α
for example by taxing husbands and allocating money to wives in a way that
changes bargaining power.
Corollary 10. Suppose UPF has the single crossing property and consider a
rise in α to α′ . (i) If it is the wife who has uncertain income and the nature
of the optimum is unchanged then the rise in α increases the expected payoff
to the wife. (ii) If the optimum at α is truthtelling and the optimum at α′ is
dishonest, and if it is the wife who has uncertain income then the expected
payoff to the wife may fall. (iii) If it is the husband who has uncertain income
and the nature of the optimum is unchanged then the rise in α decreases the
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expected payoff to the wife. (iv) If the optimum at α is truthtelling and the
optimum at α′ is dishonest, and if it is the husband who has uncertain income
then the expected payoff to the wife may rise.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 8.
The fact that u and v are not necessarily monotonic in α raises some
thorny questions about how the weights on individual utility are determined.
It might for instance be in the best interest of one partner to hide power in
order to manipulate the final value of u or v.
Proposition 11. wD − wT is monotonically increasing in δ.
Proof. wT is decreasing in δ, since any allocation that is feasible for δ is
also feasible for δ′ < δ. Meanwhile, the optimal values for uD1 and u
D
3 are
unaffected by changes. And since uD2 = u
D
1 + δ w
D is increasing in δ.
Proposition 11 shows that as δ increases (i.e. hiding becomes less costly),
the dishonest equilibrium becomes relatively more attractive. If for low δ
the truth-telling equilibrium is optimal, an increase in δ to the point where
dishonesty is optimal, may raise the expected payoff of the person who is
deceived. The intuition is simply that explained above: in the dishonest
equilibrium, the deceived person does not have to give up some payoff in
order to incentivize honesty. For increases in δ above the switching point
produce no benefits to the deceived person: all the gains go to the deceiver.
As with changes in α therefore, whether raising the cost of hiding is beneficial
to the wife depends on who has the uncertain income and which of the
equilibria is optimal. If it is the wife who has the risky income, but the
dishonest equilibrium is optimal, then raising the cost of deception will lower
her welfare provided the dishonest equilibrium is still optimal. However, if
the cost of deception becomes sufficiently high (δ is sufficiently low), that the
optimum is now truth-telling then her welfare can increase.
4.1. Diagrammatic Example.
When only one person has uncertain income, it is straightforward to
present a diagrammatic example. The three utility possibility frontiers, A,
B and C are as shown in Figure 1. Inside B and C respectively are two
broken curves, which show the utility possibility frontiers if agent 1 hides the
maximum possible from his or her spouse. Since hiding is not possible for
the lowest income level, it has no broken curve.
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Figure 1: A Truth-telling equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with Dishonesty
In Figure 1, the optimum truth-telling equilibrium is shown. At the
optimum, the utility pairs represented by a, b and c are offered in return
for signals that A, B and C are the frontiers, respectively. In this situation,
the incentive compatibility constraint is binding for agent 1 at both b and c.
In other words, the household contract offers agent 1 a utility for honestly
declaring state 3 that leaves him or her indifferent between a declaration
of state 3 and a declaration of state 2 (accompanied by hiding income).
Similarly he or she is indifferent between honestly declaring state 2 when it
occurs and dishonestly declaring state 1 and hiding income.
Figure 2 shows the same payoff structure but also shows a dishonest
allocation which may ex ante dominate the honest equilibrium. In this case,
the utility pairs are labelled by a′, b′ and c′. The pair represented by b′ is
what results when the true state is 2 but the player declares that state 1 has
occurred. Pairs a′ and c′ meanwhile are the first best outcomes in state 1
and 3 respectively. In the case of state 3, the individual 1 must weakly prefer
the allocation given by c′ and that obtainable from a declaration of state 2.
But this can be enforced by stating that a payoff of zero is receivable when
state 2 is declared.
Comparing the diagrams, it can be seen that the household is on a higher
indifference line in state 3 in the dishonest equilibrium, whereas utility is
20
lower in state 2. Agent 2 is better off in each state of the world in the
dishonest disequilibrium, whereas agent 1 is always worse off. The net effect
on ex ante household utility is ambiguous, although the diagram is suggests
that ex ante welfare is higher under the dishonest equilibrium
4.2. Numerical Example.
The diagrams are suggestive but are not numerically exact. I now give a
specific numerical example. For agent 2, income is constant at zero. There
are 3 states for agent 1 producing income yj = y0+j−1. In state of the world
j, UPF i is defined by y
2
j = u
2
j + v
2
j . If agent 1 hides 1 unit of income s/he
can obtain δ units of utility in addition to that assigned by the household
allocation rule, with 0 ≤ δ. In this situation, the first-best outcome produces
utility levels,
uj
α
=
yj√
α2+(1−α)2 =
vj
1−α . Utility for the household is then√
α2 + (1− α)23 (y0 + 1) .
For δ ≤ α√
α2+(1−α)2 , the truthful equilibrium is equal to the first best.
For instance, when α = 0.5, this requires δ ≤ 1√
2
. When δ > α√
α2+(1−α)2 in
the truthful equilibrium the constraints imply that uj = u1 + δ(j − 1) while
u1 solves,
3α
1− α =
3∑
j=1
(u1 + (j − 1)δ)
2
√
y2j − (u1 + (j − 1)δ)2
(9a)
This equation comes from using the constraints to eliminate all but u1
from the maximization problem and then deriving the first order condition
for it. Meanwhile, for the second agent, vj =
√(
y2j − u2j
)
. Average utility for
the first player is 3 (u1 + δ). Implicit differentiation of 9a shows that (u1 + δ)
is increasing in δ:
0 =
3∑
j=1
((
du1
dδ
+ 1
)
+ (j − y0 − 1)
)(
1 + (u1 + (j − 1)δ)(
y2j − (u1 + (j − 1)δ)2
)0.5
)
(10)
In other words as the cost of hiding income falls, the average utility of
player 1 rises and the average utility of player 2 falls. Overall, average welfare
falls as the equilibrium deviates further and further from the first best, in
order to accommodate the incentive compatibility constraints.
Given the results of Proposition 1, states 1 and 3 are always reported
honestly in any equilibrium. Thus any dishonest equilibrium must involve
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the misreporting of state 2. In any dishonest equilibrium, agent 1 reports
state 3 truthfully, but otherwise sends a message that the state is 1. In
this situation, the incentive compatibility constraints do not bind and
uj
α
=
y0−1+j√
α2+(1−α)2 =
vj
1−α . Meanwhile, when the state is 2, individual 1 obtains an
additional payoff of δ.
When the dishonest equilibrium is the optimal outcome, the hider loses
(comparing his or her situation to the honest equilibrium payoffs), while the
non-hider gains. The result arises because in the dishonest equilibrium the
non-hiding agent does not have to ‘bribe’ the potential hider to reveal his or
her income.
The propositions are not sufficient to determine if hiding is part of the
optimum. However, if y0 = 2 and δ ≥ 1/
√
2 for example numerical solution of
the problem reveal that hiding can be optimal. When y0 = 1, the optimum is
truthful. The difference occurs because of the gain to household welfare when
in the best state of the world, the first best outcome is obtainable. This first
best welfare rises from 2
√
4.5 when, y0 = 1, to 2
√
8. A particular example
is shown in Figure 3, below for y0 = 2. This figure shows three curves for
household utility as a function of α. The unconstrained curve shows utility
if all income is revealed and truth-telling constraints are ignored. The truth-
telling curve is the standard outcome when household utility is maximized
subject to the truthtelling constraints. The ’Dishonest’ curve depicts the case
where agent 1 misrepresents state of the world 2. As can be seen for this
value of δ, at higher levels of α (specifically when αδ ≥ 1), household utility is
maximized by not revealing state 2 truthfully, even if incentive compatibility
were not an issue. For intermediate values of α, the dishonest equilibrium
dominates the truth-telling equilibrium, while for the lowest values of α,
truth-telling is optimal.6
5. Bilateral hiding.
As noted earlier, general results in the case of bilateral hiding are hard
to come by. For that reason, I consider an example with 3×3 states, each of
equal probability to illustrate the possibilities. As before, the household aims
to maximize the weighted sum of utilities,
∑
i
∑
j (αuij + (1− α) vij). With
6With δ < 1 it is possible to have values of αfor which the dishonest equilibrium is
optimal.
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Figure 3: Household utility for δ = 1.3
two players, in addition to a possible equilibrium where both players report
all income truthfully, there are three possible equilibria involving dishonesty.
One is where both players misrepresent one or more states of the world. A
second is where the player with the higher weighting in household welfare
(the stronger partner) is dishonest, but the other player tells the truth. In
the final case it is the player with lower weighting (the weaker partner) who
misrepresents some states, while the player with the higher weighting reveals
states truthfully. I label these 3 cases, Both, Strong and Weak, respectively
and produce examples in which each of the four possible outcomes is the
optimum.
Out of 1 extra unit of hidden utility, partner 1 can achieve δi units of
utility where I allow the possibility that δ may not be same for both partners.
For the numerical example, the UPF is given by the formula:
(i+ j + 2y0 − 2)p = upij + vpij (11)
where y0 is the same for both partners and p ≥ 1 is a measure of the
curvature of the UPF. Higher values of p indicate greater concavity.
Proposition 12. (i) As δ1 increases the value of household welfare in the
Truth and Weak equilibria does not rise; (ii) the value of household welfare
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in the Strong and Both equilibria does not fall. (iii) Conversely, as δ2 rises,
the value of household welfare in the Weak and Both equilibria does not fall;
(iv) the value of household welfare in the Truth and Strong equilibria does
not rise.
Proof. Note that in all cases, the δis only enter the constraints - not the
objective function. (i) As δ1 increases, the feasible set of outcomes imple-
mentable by truth-telling shrinks in the Truth and Weak equilibria. Hence
welfare cannot rise. (ii) Conversely the set of feasible outcomes implement-
able in Strong and Both grows. Parts (iii) and (iv) mirror parts (i) and
(ii).
As in the example of the previous section, for sufficiently low values of δ,
the shape of the utility possibility frontier implies that in the unconstrained
allocation each player has the following utility level:
uij =
(i+ j + 2y0 − 2)(
1 +
(
1−α
α
) p
p−1
) 1
p
=
(
α
1− α
) 1
p−1
vij. (12)
At the unconstrained allocation, household welfare is,(
α
p
p−1 + (1− α) pp−1
) p−1
p
∑
i
∑
j
(i+ j + 2y0 − 2) (13)
It follows that 1 extra unit of income made available to the household adds(
α
p
p−1 + (1− α) pp−1
) p−1
p
to household welfare. For sufficiently high values of
δ, it is therefore optimal to consume resources privately. For α ≥ 1
2
, the
critical value is,
δc = α−1
(
α
p
p−1 + (1− α) pp−1
) p−1
p
(14)
For δ > δc, household welfare is higher when person 1 hides their income.
This function equals 2
p−1
p when α = 0.5 and declines to 1 for α = 1. For
person 2, when α > 0.5, the critical value of δ is,
δc2 = (1− α)−1
(
α
p
p−1 + (1− α) pp−1
) p−1
p
(15)
For α > 0.5 , δc2 > δc. Essentially when α > 0.5, the second player has a
lower weight in household welfare. Thus it is relatively more productive to
put their income into the household pool rather than consuming it privately.
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In the truth-telling equilibrium, each player must send a message without
knowing the message of the other player. As a result the incentive constraints
apply to average utilities, viz:
ui1 + ui2 + ui3 ≥ ui−1 1 + ui−1 2 + ui−13 + 3δ1 i = j0 + 1, ..., N (16a)
v1i + v2i + v3i ≥ v1 i−1 + v2 i−1 + v3 i−1 + 3δ2 i = j0 + 1, ..., N (16b)
As in the previous section, it is only the intermediate state that might
be misrepresented. When α = 0.5, and p = 2, it is possible to show that,
for instance, vij = uji which together with the production constraint implies
that, uji =
√
(yi + yj)
2 − u2ij. By this means an algebraic solution is obtain-
able. In other cases, I find purely numerical solutions. Define a household as
symmetric if α = 0.5 and δ1 = δ2.
Proposition 13. There exist (different) values of y0, δi, p, α such that (i)
all types of equilibria are optimal; (ii) the household is symmetric and the
Both equilibrium is optimal; (iii) α > 0.5, but the equilibrium is Weak; (iv)
α > 0.5, but the equilibrium is Strong; (v) dishonesty is not privately efficient,
but the optimum is dishonest.
Proof. The proof is by the examples below with the proof of part (i) provided
by the totality of the subsequent examples.
I prove part (ii) using Figure 4 which shows household welfare for various
values of p, but where in all cases, α = 0.5, y0 = 0, and δi = 1.2. In
this diagram I omit the data for Strong since it is identical to the Weak
equilibrium. It can be seen that for lower values of p, it is optimal for both
agents to be dishonest. At higher levels of p (i.e. where the UPF is more
concave), the Truthful equilibrium is the optimum.
In Figure 5 where alpha is varied between 0.5 and 0.99, the optimum varies
between a dishonest equilibrium in which the Weak player misrepresents some
income and a truth-telling equilibrium when values of α are closer to 0.5. This
proves part (iii) of the proposition that the optimum may involve the Weaker
partner hiding income. Note that this involves a case in which it is costlier
for the Weak person to hide income.
I prove part (iv) using Figure 6 which shows household welfare for the four
possible equilibria for different values of δ2, but where in all cases, α = 0.6,
y0 = 0, p = 2 and δ1 = 1.2. So partner 1 is the stronger. For partner 2, δ2
varies from 0.8 to 1.3. Where the weak player is dishonest, household welfare
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Figure 4: Household utility for δ1 = 1.2.
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Figure 5: Household utility as alpha varies, for δ1 = 1, δ2 = 0.9,.0 y0 = 0, p = 1.5.
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Figure 6: Household utility for δ1 = 1.2.
is increasing in δ2 because the hidden resources provide more value to the
weak player as δ2 rises. Where this is the case, individual and household
welfare is linear in δ2. Where the equilibria requires the weak partner to
tell the truth, δ2 enters the constraints on allocations. As a result household
welfare is decreasing in δ2. As can be seen, the optimum varies with δ2.
For low values the optimum requires some misrepresentation by the stronger
player and truth-telling in equilibrium by the weaker partner. For higher
values, both players misrepresent the intermediate levels of income at the
optimum, which is perhaps not surprising given that for higher values of
δi we approach a situation where even the first best equilibrium involves
’hiding’. Nevertheless for the parameters used here it is still the case that
the first best case solution does not involve misrepresentation: both players
contribute all income to the household.
In Figure 7 which I use to prove part (v) alpha is again plotted on the x
axis. In this example the gains from dishonesty are symmetric and dishonesty
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Figure 7: Household utility as alpha varies, for δi = 0.9, y0 = 0, p = 1.1.
is not privately optimal. I plot utility for values of alpha between 0.3 and
0.7, but the trends shown continue to the extreme values of 0 and 1. For
simplicity, player 1 is always described as strong even though for α < 0.5,
more weight in the household welfare function is placed on the other player.
Here for low values of alpha the optimum is one where player 1 is dishonest;
around α = 0.5, truth-telling is optimal and for higher values of α, the
optimum involves misrepresentation by player 2.
Taken together these figures do not offer a simple picture of when each
equilibrium is optimal, but they do illustrate the fact that each type is pos-
sible. We see examples of hiding by both strong and weak players and situ-
ations where it is efficient for both players to hide.
6. Conclusions.
Income and consumption hiding seems to be a regular part of intra-
household decision-making in some societies. Spouses routinely keep some
income and consumption from their partners, although the extent of this is
limited and typically a cost of some kind must be incurred. It is straight-
forward to put forward a model in which agents wish to hide assets, given
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that the equilibrium notion does not take into account this possibility. How-
ever, it is not obviously clear why spouses would agree to rules that encour-
age dishonesty when hidden consumption is less efficient than openly made
spending. In this paper I present a theory that can allow dishonesty in an
equilibrium that is Pareto efficient ex ante. By means of an extended ex-
amples we can see that partners with higher costs of hiding are less likely to
hide in equilibrium. Mutual hiding may indeed be optimal. In general there
is no monotonic relationship between hiding and power, though when there
is one-sided asymmetric information, misrepresenting income is positively
linked to the weight in household utility.
The theory presented here is not complete in the sense that there may be
other motives for hiding assets, some of which are apparent in the articles sur-
veyed in section 2 and in the non-cooperative models of Malapit (2009) and
Castilla and Walker (2013). A particularly obvious motive is that relation-
ships can end, through divorce or death and partners may wish to (secretly)
insure against the adverse effects that come with separation. Why secret?
Openly saving money for divorce may send the wrong signals about the state
of the relationship and hasten the actual end of the marriage.7 A third but
possibly less clear-cut set of reasons for individuals to hide money from their
partners involves a demand for autonomy. Autonomy is the ability to decide
matters for oneself. Many individuals have some preference for autonomy.
As such it is not necessarily reflected in a demand for goods or services but in
the demand for control, for a ‘room of one’s own’. Negotiated spending over
money may not satisfy such a demand, whereas having a separate budget
that is at least in part hidden from a partner may produce some satisfac-
tion. Of course there may be many other motives for hiding. For example,
behavioural economists also discuss notions of temptation: an inability or
a reduced ability to commit to certain patterns of behaviour in the future.
Spouses who publicly share a whole budget may be unable to refrain from
constant bickering over its use. Hiding money may eliminate the temptation
to interfere. So this paper has only dealt with one aspect of why spouses
may wish to hide money or other assets from one another, but that does not
preclude other motives from being important.
7In the model presented here, the hidden income can be thought of as saving for possible
marital breakdown. What is not captured in the model is the possibility that the hidden
asset, if discovered would increase the probability of separation.
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AppendixA. Household allocation decisions.
As an aside, we present a model of allocation that is consistent with the
examples presented in sections 3 and 4. The utility for the partners are,
u = zxβ1 + δ1r1
v = zxβ2 + δ2r2
In the equations, x1 and x2 are expenditures on private goods purchased
from the publicly observable household budget, while z is the household
public good. The goods, r1 and r2 represent hidden (private) consumption
expenditure. The partners must allocate resources between household goods
and private consumption. If total income 2y0 + i + j is reported then the
welfare maximizing value of z is,
z =
2y0 + i+ j
1 + β
It follows that the UPF for declared income is,
u
1/β
ij + v
1/β
ij = β
(
(2y0 + i+ j)
1 + β
)β+1
β
In other words, 1/β corresponds to p in the examples. Meanwhile, if player
i hides 1 unit of income then she or he obtains an extra δi. in private con-
sumption.
AppendixB. Omitted Proofs.
Proof. [Proposition 5] Part (i) Either uTi+1 = u
T
i +δ in the Truthful solution or
uTi = u
∗
i . As a result, when the same truth-telling constraints are binding at
both α′ and α then by the same kind of revealed preference argument used in
Proposition 4 the proposition holds. When different truth-telling constraints
apply at α′ and α then, since there are two truth-telling constraints in each
case and each constraint may be binding or not, there are potentially 12 cases
in which the pattern differs between α′ and α. In the table below I set out
the proof for each case. Binding and non-binding constraints are indicated
by 0 and 1 respectively. For example 0,1 means that uT3 = u
T
2 + δ while
uT1 = u
∗
1. I say that u1 is free in such a case while u3 is bound (the status
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of u2 is not clear). Three basic observations are in order. First, if a truth-
telling constraint is non-binding then the difference between the two relevant
utilities must be at least δ. Second, if a truth-telling constraint is binding on
u1 then u1 must lie below its unconstrained value. Third, if a truth-telling
constraint is binding on u3 then u3 must lie above its unconstrained value.
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α α′ Proof
0, 0 1, 0 Suppose uT
′
1 < u
T
1 , then u
T ′
2 < u
T
2 and so u
T ′
2 < u
∗
2 ≤ u∗′2 , but u3 is free
so can raise u2 and with it, w. Thus u
T ′
1 ≥ uT1 . u3 is always free, so
uT
′
3 ≥ uT3 . At α, u2 is free. If it is free at α′ then u2 rises. If not then
uT
′
2 ≥ u∗′2 . But u∗′2 ≥ u∗2, so u2 also rises.
0, 0 0, 1 u1 is free so rises. Suppose u
T ′
3 > u
T
3 , then u
T ′
2 > u
T
2 as well. At α
′,
uT
′
3 ≥ u∗′3 but u∗′3 ≥ u∗3 so u3 and u2 are also higher.
0, 0 1, 1 If uT
′
1 ≤ uT1 , then all ui are lower, so uT ′1 > uT1 . Suppose uT ′3 < uT3 then,
w can be raised by increasing u3 without breaking constraints. Suppose
uT
′
2 < u
T
2 , then u3 is also lower and in particular, u
T ′
3 < u
∗
3 < u
∗′
3 . But
then w can be raised by increasing u3.
0, 1 0, 0 Since u1 is free, it rises. u
T
2≤ u∗2 . Thus, uT2 ≤ u∗2 < u∗′2 = uT ′2 . Suppose
u3 falls then u2 is also lower. Hence u3 rises.
0, 1 1,0 Because of the pattern of binding constraints, uT2 ≤ u∗2 and uT ′2 ≥ u∗′2 so
u2 rises. if u3 falls, u2 falls as well so u3 rises. (u2 − u1) falls, and u2
rises so uT1 ≤ uT ′1 .
0, 1 1,1 If uT
′
1 < u
T
1 , then u2 and u3 also fall. So u
T ′
1 ≥ uT1 . If u2 is lower, then
u3 is also lower
1,0 0,0 Since u3 is free, u3 increases. At α, u
T
1 ≤ u∗1, but at α′ it is free so u1
rises. If uT
′
2 < u
T
2 , then the lower constraint would be binding at α
′.
Hence u2 also rises.
1,0 0,1 Since uT1 is constrained, u
T
1 < u
∗
1. At α
′, u1 is unconstrained so uT
′
1 ≥ uT1
. Since uT2 − uT1 = δ and uT ′2 − uT ′1 ≥ δ then uT2 ≥ uT ′2 .
1,0 1,1 If uT
′
1 < u
T
1 , then u2 also falls, but then u
T ′
3 is not bound. Thus u1 and
u2 rise. If u3 falls then u
T ′
3 < u
∗′
3 so could increase w by increasing u3.
1,1 0,0 uT1≤ u∗1 so u1 definitely rises. It follows that both u2 and u3 rise.
1,1 0,1 uT1≤ u∗1 while u3 ≥ u∗′3 . uT ′1 = u∗′1 so u1 increases, but then u2 must
increase too. and since u3 is bound to u2 at both α and α
′ it increases
as well.
1,1 1,0 uT1≤ u∗1 while uT3≥ u∗3. If u3 falls then u1 and u2 also fall. So u3 rises. If
u1 falls then so does u2 while v1 and v2 rise. Suppose this is the case,
then, (α′ − α) [(uT ′1 + uT ′2 − uT1 − uT2 ) + (vT1 + vT2 − vT ′1 − vT ′2 )] < 0.
The solutions at α and α′ satisfy the constraints at α′and α, so:
α′(uT
′
1 + u
T ′
2 − uT1 − uT2 ) ≥ (1− α′)
(
vT1 + v
T
2 − vT ′1 − vT ′2
)
and
α(uT1 + u
T
2 − uT ′1 − uT ′2 ) ≥ (1− α)
(
vT
′
1 + v
T ′
2 − vT1 − vT2
)
. Adding
inequalities yields the contradiction:
(α′ − α) [(uT ′1 + uT ′2 − uT1 − uT2 ) + (vT1 + vT2 − vT ′1 − vT ′2 )] ≥ 0 .
37
Part (ii). In the case of the Dishonest solution, the incentive compatibility
constraints are not binding for i = 1, 3. Thus the results come straight from
uDi = u
∗
i i = 1, 3 and a revealed preference argument that u
∗′
i > u
∗
i i = 1, 3.
For i = 2, uD2 = u
D
1 + δ, so u2 also increases with α.
Proof. [Proposition 6] We need to establish that if household utility is the
same in the two equilibria, then (u−v) is higher in the dishonest equilibrium.
This is equivalent to showing that uD > uT where uD is utility in the dis-
honest equilibrium and uT is utility in the truth-telling equilibrium. In the
case of the truth-telling equilibrium, the maximization problem is as follows
(non-negative constraints on the variables are omitted for brevity):∑
j
(αuj + (1− α) vj) (B.1)
subject to,
u3 − u2 − δ ≥ 0 (B.2)
u2 − u1 − δ ≥ 0 (B.3)
f3 (u3)− v3 ≥ 0 (B.4)
f2 (u2)− v2 ≥ 0 (B.5)
f1 (u1)− v1 ≥ 0 (B.6)
In the case of the dishonest equilibrium, if we consider u2 and v2 as
the actual allocations in state 2 (rather than messages sent), then in the
maximization problem, B.1 remains the same, as do (B.3), (B.4) and (B.6).
However, (B.2) and (B.5) must be replaced by,
u3 − δ ≥ 0 (B.7)
f1 (u2 − δ)− v2 ≥ 0 (B.8)
v2 − v1 = 0 (B.9)
By a revealed preference argument, the solution to maximization of (B.1)
subject to the constraints (B.2)-(B.6) must not be feasible when the con-
straints are (B.3), (B.4), (B.6) and (B.7)-(B.9) and vice versa, unless (uD, vD)
=(uT , vT ) . For instance if (uD, vD) with (uD, vD) 6=(uT , vT ) , satisfies the
constraints of the truth-telling equilibrium, then so does a strictly convex
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combination of (uD, vD) and (uT , vT ) . But then since f (.) is strictly con-
vex, we can find (uT ′, vT ′) where (uTi , v
T
i )=(u
T ′
i , v
T ′
i ) , i = 1, 2 and (u
T ′
3 , v
T ′
3 )>
(uT3 , v
T
3 ) and that also satisfies all the constraints. Then (u
T , vT ) was not the
optimum for truth-telling. A similar argument to applied to the case where
the truth-tellling solution also satisfies dishonest equilibrium constraints. So,
(uD, vD) either does not satisfy (B.2) or (B.5) or both. Conversely (uT , vT )
does not satisfy at least one of (B.7)-(B.9). Since (B.2) is satisfied by uT and
uTi ≥ 0, then (B.7) is also satisfied. Moreover if (B.9) is satisfied by uT then
applying (B.3) the constraint (B.8) would also be met. It follows that (B.8)
is not satisfied. In other words, f1(u
T
2 − δ) < vT2 . vT2 6= vT1 .
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